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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the threat of autonomous system (AS) and Internet ex-
change (IX) level adversaries on Tor, currently the most widely deployed and
used anonymity overlay network. Of particular interest is the possibility of
a single AS or IX point observing both the path from the client to the entry
node and the path from the exit node to the final destination. Experimen-
tal results indicate that a non-trivial number of circuits are vulnerable to
such compromise. A novel AS-level path prediction algorithm is developed
in order to allow the client to choose paths without vulnerabilities. The path
prediction algorithm sacrifices some accuracy in the top path prediction in
order to decrease the hardware requirements necessary to predict AS-level
paths and is simple enough to run on standard client hardware. We validate
the accuracy of the path predictor first compared to classical path prediction
algorithms, then compared to traceroute data taken from Planet Lab. The
simulator predicts paths with similar sets of ASes and links finding 90% of the
actual ASes seen in the traceroute data. The effects of choosing paths utiliz-
ing the new path predictions is then investigated to find that load balancing
is adversely affected. The entropy loss due to the new path selection method
is also investigated, specifically the entropy of the client from an adversary
observing the exit/destination path. We find that choosing paths with our
new path selection algorithm results in minimal entropy loss. Overall, the
results demonstrate that the new path simulator is a lightweight solution to
defend against AS and IX-level compromise of anonymous communication
paths on the Internet and should be considered for deployment to maintain
the privacy guarantees of such systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has changed the way the world communicates by facilitating
open data sharing to parties around the world at the speed of light. This
new medium has opened the door to new ways to not only retrieve informa-
tion and communicate but also conduct business as well. With the ease of
entering a web address in a web browser, it is easy to lose sight of the un-
derlying communication architecture and the entities that may be observing
a user’s every activity while interacting across the Internet. Perhaps users
would take little notice while looking up the weather or checking on the lo-
cal sports teams, but many would prefer to conduct their activities without
the threat of third-party observation. Privacy by personal preference aside,
there are other scenarios which would benefit from a private communication
channel running across the Internet. Perhaps bank customers would not like
their internet service provider to infer what financial institutions they are
conducting business with. Perhaps an employee at a company requires a
secure channel to talk to law enforcement in order to report illegal activity
within their own company. Perhaps the Internet user lives under a repressive
regime and requires anonymity to maintain contact with the outside world.
Regardless of the reason, much research and effort has been put forth in or-
der to develop tools to allow parties to communicate on the Internet without
necessarily exposing the end point of the communication.
It is important to understand that the underlying Internet protocols were
not designed to mask the privacy of the communicating parties. The In-
ternet in use today has grown from a small research project determined to
solve monumental challenges in scaling the size of networks by joining small
networks into a larger whole in an open and accessible way. The network pro-
tocols inherently are designed to be simple with most functionality on the
outside of the network. In the design of such lightweight protocols, consider-
ation for security and privacy was largely left out of the initial specifications.
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The inherent problem is that internet protocol packets are routed based en-
tirely on the source and destination addresses contained in the packet head-
ers. These addresses allow all the forwarding routers on the communication
path to see both the sender and recipient routers. For example, from the
University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign, it takes, on average, eight hops
to retrieve www.google.com. In this example, all ten intermediary routers
may observe the source address and Google’s address. Therefore, curious
intermediate routers can infer some information about the behavior of users
at the source internet protocol address. Users wishing to stop intermediate
routers from inferring the target of their communication are left without op-
tions with the internet protocols in use today. This need creates an avenue
of research to allow such communication to take place without the possibility
of intermediate routers identifying participants.
This thesis will investigate the usefulness of such protocols in the face of
formidable adversaries. Specifically, it will investigate the vulnerabilities to
two types of adversaries currently not mitigated in threat models to anony-
mous communication. The first is an adversary that has a global view of
an entire autonomous system (AS). This adversary could be an internet ser-
vice provider or perhaps a large transit provider such as AT&T or Verizon
wireless. The second type of adversary is an internet exchange point (IX). In-
ternet exchange points are rapidly becoming major players for routing traffic
on the internet through peering agreements. By linking many autonomous
systems, they provide a threat to compromising paths which are assumed
to be simultaneously unobservable by current threat models to anonymous
communication.
In order to study the effects of such adversaries, the reader must first
understand the current standards for low latency anonymous communication
and a little about the underlying structure of the Internet. Chapter 2 will
provide such a foundation. To predict susceptibility to path compromise for
a large adversary, it is important to be able to determine the path the traffic
will take on an autonomous system level. Chapter 3 will survey the state of
path prediction and mapping on the Internet as well as conduct an initial
analysis of the vulnerability of path compromise to AS and IX adversaries.
Chapter 4 will build on this analysis by creating a new computationally
feasible AS path prediction algorithm and analyzing the accuracy of the
method. The vulnerability of anonymous systems to AS and IX threats will
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then be re-evaluated. Chapter 5 will examine countermeasures as well as
possible losses in anonymity and load balancing when mitigating the threat
of AS level and IX-level attacks. Finally, Chapter 6 will present conclusions
and recommendations for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Understanding the Underlying Internet
In order to understand the threat model to end-to-end anonymous commu-
nication, it is necessary to understand what the Internet looks like and how
it operates. In this work, the Internet is defined as devices which run the
Internet protocol and are connected to the worldwide network on an adver-
tised routable Internet address. Each device on the Internet is assigned an
Internet protocol (IP) address used to identify it on the global network to
receive packets. Local networks run the Internet protocol in order to estab-
lish routing tables which allow systems to communicate with interior routing
policies normally using OSPF or IS-IS [2], [3]. A group of systems running
the Internet protocol on a local network which is under the control of a sin-
gle entity is referred to as an autonomous system (AS). The Internet itself is
composed of thousands of autonomous systems ranging in size and purpose
from small end-point networks such as Internet service providers and hosting
companies to large transit networks such as AT&T or Verizon. It is impor-
tant to understand that different autonomous systems have different business
models to make money. The smaller AS is generally making money through
connecting costumers to the network or hosting content. The larger more
connected transit AS is generally making money by charging for transit ser-
vices or charging to send traffic through their network to get to other ASes.
Each AS generally has distinct subnets of Internet addresses that it owns.
Traffic headed for an address in a particular AS should be routed through
the network in order to reach that AS. Within AS systems, traffic is routed
according to the local policy of the AS which is administered internally to the
AS. Between ASes traffic is routed according to prefix tables updated using
border gateway protocol (BGP) [4]. Border gateway protocol is unique be-
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cause it does not strictly adhere to traditional metrics for path selection such
as lowest latency or shortest path but instead is focused on allowing ASes to
model various business agreements in order to choose cheapest paths which
are most economically feasible for the AS to route traffic. This flexibility
makes BGP a particularly complex protocol to analyze and understand in
order to predict how traffic will be routed on the Internet.
Traditionally, the AS level graph of the Internet has looked like a tree with
top level ASes forming a backbone of communication and Internet service
providers and content providers forming leaves on the tree. Under this model,
most links have been classified as one of four types: provider-to-customer,
customer-to-provider, peer-to-peer, and sibling-to-sibling. The first two de-
scribe traffic flow which costs the customer money in order to send and receive
traffic to and from the provider. The third type is used between ASes which
have agreed to transit each other’s traffic for free. The last type is reserved
for ASes which are separate but owned by an entity which will transit traffic
for free with itself. Generally, traffic is routed to the destination with a pref-
erence for sending traffic along links to customers since these make money
for the AS. If no such link is available, then the AS will try to transit over
free peer-to-peer or sibling-to-sibling links. The AS will send traffic to a
provider and pay for the traffic only if no other path is available. This model
is demonstrated in Figure 2.1. In this example, Alice would traditionally be
expected to send traffic to the server via the top level ASes through the path
AS1→AS2→AS3→AS4→AS5→AS6. This path would require AS1 to pay
AS2 and AS2 to pay AS3 on the way up to the top level ASes, and AS6 to
pay AS5 and AS5 to pay AS4 as the traffic is transmitted from the top level
ASes to the destination router.
While top-tier ASes have commonly formed peer-to-peer agreements, the
recent trend has been for ASes lower in the graph to also establish direct
peering agreements or agreements to transit traffic for free with other ASes.
These new peering links are established between ASes in order to bypass
the need to send traffic further up the graph, thereby saving them money.
Figure 2.1 shows this type of agreement. By establishing peering links AS2
can send traffic directly to AS5, bypassing the need for both AS2 and AS5
to pay AS3 and AS4 to transit traffic. Thus, Alice’s traffic would follow
AS1→ AS2→AS5→AS6. This business model is being proposed by Internet
exchange points which have set up data centers where smaller ASes can place
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Figure 2.1: Example Subset of the AS-level Internet Graph
a router to peer with other ASes at the same physical location. Peering points
are becoming more utilized by ASes to save money. This trend introduces the
possibility of making seemingly unrelated anonymous communication paths
simultaneously observable at a single Internet exchange point because an
adversary with a global view of the exchange point could intercept traffic
moving across every pair of peering ASes at that physical location. This
possibility creates a new threat to anonymous communication that must be
investigated and possibly mitigated.
2.2 Brief History of Anonymous Communication
Formally, this thesis will investigate anonymous communication systems which
seek to hide the fact that users are communicating with each other. There-
fore if a user Alice decides that she would like to converse with a user Bob,
to maintain anonymity, we require that no one on the communication chan-
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Figure 2.2: Goal of Anonymous Communication: Protect the Linkability of
the Communicating Parties
nel can tell that Alice is talking to Bob even if the adversary observes the
communication path between Alice and Bob as shown in Figure 2.2. Note
that it is acceptable for an intermediary router to realize that Alice is com-
municating with someone and Bob is communicating with someone. It is
even acceptable for an adversary to realize that they are both hiding the
destination of their traffic. The only requirement is that it is statistically
improbable for an adversary to determine conclusively that Alice is in fact
talking to Bob.
Hiding the destination of communication on the Internet is inherently diffi-
cult due to the way traffic is propagated across the network. A client wishing
to communicate will first split the data to be sent into small packets each
wrapped in an Internet protocol header. This header is used by routers to
get the traffic to the correct destination. The client will send these packets
out to its gateway router which will in turn forward the packets to other
routers based on which router it believes is closest to the destination address
in the IP header. This continues on a hop by hop basis until the packet
reaches the final destination [5], [6]. In order for the packet forwarding to
work correctly, the destination address must be contained in clear text in the
Internet protocol header. For the destination to respond to the source of the
communication, the source address must also be correct. Thus, by the very
nature of how the Internet works, each hop on the path can see the source
and destination addresses. Since the forwarding is done best-effort inside the
network, the user has no control over where his packet hops or even com-
pletely concrete knowledge of which routers handle his packets. Therefore, an
adversary on any of the forwarding routers can infer information about the
communication taking place and the user does not have a built-in mechanism
to keep his packets from traversing malicious routers.
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Perhaps the simplest solution to hiding the end recipient of communication
parties is to have the client connect through a proxy router. Unfortunately,
proxies require a single trusted party which is prone to failure and compro-
mise, as well as susceptible to being observable to a local adversary [7], [8].
To create a scalable solution, the research community has proposed numerous
overlay networks to allow a user to forward traffic anonymously. These can be
generally classified as either high-latency or low-latency anonymous overlay
networks. High-latency networks are designed to send messages anonymously
by delaying, mixing, and sending data with cover traffic in batches, thereby
making it statistically improbable for an adversary to link the sender and
receiver even with a globally correct view of every packet transmitted in the
network [9], [10], [11]. These systems or mix-nets are provably secure; how-
ever, the process of batch sending in rounds causes high latency, making them
unusable for interactive tasks such as web browsing or instant messaging [10].
To facilitate web browsing, low-latency communication networks have been
developed to forward traffic quickly through the overlay network. These net-
works sacrifice some of the privacy guarantees of the high-latency designs to
improve the speed of the network. This speed increase is possible when the
adversarial model is limited to a local passive adversary or an adversary that
cannot simultaneously observe every node in the network at the same time.
More specifically, it has been demonstrated that the adversary should be un-
able to observe both the entry path from the client to the anonymity network
and the path from the anonymity network to the destination simultaneously.
This thesis will focus on analyzing the susceptibility of low-latency commu-
nication networks to adversaries both controlling entire autonomous systems
(ASes) as well as entire Internet exchange points (IXPs).
2.3 Low-Latency Communication and Tor
The most popular low-latency anonymous communication system in use to-
day is the Tor network. Tor, or The Onion Router, is the second generation of
systems developed to implement onion routing [1]. Tor is currently deployed
on the Internet with roughly 2,500 volunteer onion routers and an estimated
250,000 daily users [12]. The idea behind onion routing is to forward traffic
through various intermediate overlay routers in order to mask the final des-
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Figure 2.3: Example Tor Circuit between Alice and Bob
tination of the traffic [13]. Figure 2.3 shows the basic structure of an onion
route as implemented in the Tor network. The client Alice has a message to
send to the server A but wants to send the message anonymously. In order
to do this, Alice will send the packet through three onion routers to hide the
path. Alice wraps the packet in three levels of encryption denoted by the
red, green, and blue circles using encryption keys negotiated during the con-
struction of the onion circuit. Alice then sends the packet to the entry onion
router which has the blue encryption key. The entry router (also referred
to as the guard router) decrypts the blue layer, recovers the stream number
correlating to the middle onion router, and forwards the packet to the middle
onion router. The middle router repeats the same procedure to decrypt the
packet for the exit and then forwards the packet to the exit router which uses
its key to decrypt the red layer. The final To A message is then sent by the
exit onion router to the server.
Privacy along this path is protected in a number of ways. First, the payload
of the message is encrypted until the last onion router. The server A observes
the request originating from the exit onion router and responds back along
the same onion route. Thus, the client is hidden from the server. Any ob-
server to Alice only sees an encrypted message entering the first onion router.
Since these machines are well known volunteers who forward Tor traffic, the
nature of the message cannot be inferred from the destination address. The
system is also protected from man-in-the-middle attacks because an attacker
would not have the encryption keys. Even if the attacker controls one of
the onion routers, he cannot break the security of the link. For example, if
the attacker compromises the entry node, he can get the message origin, but
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cannot ascertain the destination. If the attacker compromises the exit node,
he can ascertain the destination of the traffic, but does not know the original
sender due to not knowing any nodes in the path prior to the middle onion
router.
Tor provides users with a usable low-latency anonymous communication
overlay network using onion routing by allowing the user access to a network
of volunteer onion routers. To use the network, the user downloads the Tor
client and sends traffic through its built in Socks proxy. First, the client
will download the list of onion routers from a central directory authority of
roughly 2,500 onion routers. This contains the name and addresses of the
routers, uptime, statuses, flags designating the routers as entry nodes and
exit node capabilities, and public keys used in securing communication with
the routers. The client then chooses three routers from this list in order to
construct an onion circuit.
The client uses a predetermined path selection algorithm to select an entry
node, an exit node and a middle node [14]. Each of the three nodes must
satisfy a number of requirements. First, to limit the possibility of a Sybil
attack whereby a malicious user would flood the network with nodes to con-
duct traffic analysis, all nodes on a circuit must be on separate /16 subnets.
This requirement is meant to make it difficult for an adversary with a single
IP address space to be chosen for the entire circuit thereby compromising
the anonymity of the circuit. The entry node is important since it is the only
node in the Tor network to know the identity of the client. Originally, the
entry node was selected uniformly weighted by the available routers’ band-
width; however, numerous attacks were demonstrated which allowed a node
with high bandwidth to observe a disproportional number of clients using
the system over time [15]. To limit the number of clients an attacker can ob-
serve, the concept of guard nodes was introduced. The idea is for the client
to select a few (currently three) nodes to act as entry nodes for that client.
Using guard nodes, the client’s identity is only exposed to these three onion
routers. Thus, when first initializing, the client will select a few nodes with
the guard flag set and use the first three of those nodes selected randomly
weighted by bandwidth to serve as the entry node for all subsequent circuits.
The guard node flag is set on an onion router if the router has been up and
running for the last 30 days and has a greater median uptime than all known
routers as well as at least 250 KB/s of bandwidth.
10
The exit node is selected based on the onion router’s exit policy. The exit
policy is simply a list of all addresses to which the router will send traffic.
This allows the parties maintaining the exit node to have limited control
over where the traffic is being sent in order to stop attacks and misuse of the
Tor system. Of course, the client must check to confirm that the exit node
will forward traffic to the intended destination. The client will compile a list
of all available exit nodes and then select one randomly weighted by their
available bandwidth.
The middle node is also selected randomly weighted by the available band-
width of the remaining nodes with a few important considerations to min-
imize overuse of guard and exit nodes. First, the client will calculate the
total bandwidth for all available onion routers T . It will then calculate all
the available bandwidth for the nodes with the guard flag set G and the avail-
able bandwidth for the nodes with the exit node flag set E. If E > T/3, the
remaining exit routers will be added to the list of potential middle routers
with their bandwidth scaled using the scaling factor: (E − T/3)/E. Like-
wise, if G > T/3, the remaining guard nodes will be added to the list of
potential middle routers with their bandwidth scaled using the scaling fac-
tor: (G − T/3)/G. All routers without the guard flag and exit flag are also
added to the list of potential middle routers without any bandwidth scaling.
Finally, the middle router is chosen randomly from the list weighted on the
scaled bandwidth. For more information on the path building algorithm see
the path specification [14].
Once the routers are selected, the client will begin to build the actual
circuit. This is done in a telescoping manner. First, the client will establish
a connection with the guard router using a Diffie-Helman key exchange. The
client will then send a message to the guard to extend the circuit to the
middle router. This will cause another Diffie-Helman key exchange to be
established between the guard and the middle node. Finally, the client will
send another extend message through the tunnel to the middle node which
will extend the circuit to the exit node. It is important to note that the
second extend message is encrypted to the entry node. Thus, the entry node
only sees the client and the middle node. Likewise, the exit node only sees
the middle node and the destination. Once the circuit is established with
the exit node, the client can send traffic through the circuit by wrapping the
request in encryption and sending it to the entry router. The final message
11
Figure 2.4: Tor’s Circuit Building Procedure [1]
format sent through the channel sending a payload P to the destination D
through the guard node G, middle router M and exit node EX is encoded by
the client as follows: EG(M ||EM(EX||EEX(D||P ))). This process is shown
in Figure 2.4
The Tor network has proven to be resilient to adversaries as long as they
cannot simultaneously compromise the path from the client to the guard
node and the path from the exit node to the target. If an adversary can
compromise both these paths, it is trivial to correlate the streams by nu-
merous statistical attacks [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. Therefore, much
work has been conducted in stopping the adversary from compromising both
paths at the same time as well as masking the traffic to stop the correlation.
However, it is generally accepted that the security of the system relies on the
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user constructing a circuit that does not have an adversary on both the paths
simultaneously. Therefore, it is important to investigate the threat of global
AS and IX adversaries which could observe both paths simultaneously.
2.3.1 Related Work
The threat of AS-level adversaries was first identified and analyzed by Feam-
ster and Dingledine [22]. They determined that approximately 10%-30% of
Tor circuits were vulnerable to compromise by an AS-level adversary. This
study is now outdated because they assumed a uniform path selection policy
in Tor as well as a substantially smaller Tor network. The study was updated
by Edman and Syverson, who found a 17% rate of AS compromise to Tor cir-
cuits using updated path prediction algorithms and accurate models of Tor’s
node selection algorithm [23]. Edman and Syverson further proposed using
Dijkstra’s algorithm on an AS level graph to predict AS-level compromise,
but found that such a method still yields roughly a 10% compromise rate.
More recently, Ahkhoondi and Madhyastha proposed a new path selection
algorithm based upon geographical proximity of onion routers in order to
reduce latency [24]. Their work identifies the possibility of compromise from
AS adversaries and introduces a simplified AS path prediction algorithm to
eliminate AS adversaries from the path. Murdoch and Zieliski analyzed the
capability of IX points to capture Tor and analyze Tor traffic even when rout-
ing on the order of Gb/s [25]. They proved that effective analysis can still be
conducted with substantial cover traffic in high bandwidth data centers. This
confirms the threat of an IX-level adversary on anonymous communication
networks.
This work expands upon Edman and Syverson’s contribution by first reaf-
firming the compromise rates and applying new path prediction algorithms
which can run on the client in order to more accurately predict the AS and
IX-level threats. This work is also the first to predict the compromise rates
of IX adversaries. To confirm the accuracy of the new path prediction algo-
rithm, path predictions will be compared to real traceroute data with both
the top path and the top N paths from the prediction algorithms. Also a
detailed analysis on the performance and privacy implications of choosing
paths using the new path prediction algorithms will be conducted. Both of
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these issues are important to investigate the broader impact of introducing
a new path selection algorithm to anonymity systems both to privacy of the
clients and to total load balancing on the network. All the work in this paper
is relevant to the work conducted by Ahkhoondi and Madhyastha but with
a greater focus on the effects of eliminating the threat of AS and IX adver-
saries. Thus, client latency is not considered and the impact of identifying
IX-level adversaries on a geographical path selection algorithm is left as a
topic of future work.
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CHAPTER 3
VULNERABILITY OF AS AND IXP
ADVERSARIES ON TOR
3.1 Overview
It is important to first investigate the current vulnerability of the Tor anonymity
network to AS and IX-level adversaries. As a Tor user, we will choose from
the directory authority’s list of onion routers a guard router, a middle router,
and an exit router in order to set up a secure circuit. Due to the nature of
the Internet, all traffic travelling from our client machine to our guard router
(client path) and from the chosen exit to the final destination (host path) will
travel across numerous autonomous systems before reaching its final desti-
nation. The circuit is susceptible to compromise from an AS-level adversary
if the same AS is an intermediate hop on both the client and host paths as
shown on the left in Figure 3.1. If both the client and host paths traverse
through links that are peered in the same IXP, then the circuit is vulnerable
to compromise by an IX-level adversary as shown on the right side of Figure
3.1.
3.2 Predicting AS-level Paths on the Internet
In order to investigate the threat of AS-level and IX-level adversaries on low
latency communication systems such as Tor, it is necessary to be able to ac-
curately determine the AS-level path that traffic will take between a source
AS and a destination AS. Predicting the hops that traffic will use to reach a
destination on the Internet is not a trivial problem. Traffic on the Internet
has the possibility of flowing across thousands of distinctly managed ASes,
each of which has its own internal routing policies. At the most basic level,
the sheer scale of the Internet makes it difficult to completely map every part
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Figure 3.1: Vulnerabilities from AS and IXP
of the network. Furthermore, inter-AS communication is handled using pol-
icy driven routing decisions negotiated by BGP. Thus, even a detailed map
of the Internet does not necessarily yield accurate paths because the rout-
ing tables are not generated using predictable routing policies such as those
used in shortest-path or lowest-latency path selection algorithms. Since AS
administrators treat their routing policies as internal, proprietary informa-
tion, most measurements of AS routing must be done externally with the
types of links being unknown to the observer. Finally, any path prediction
algorithm will have difficulty due to churn on the network, temporary link
failures, and traffic engineering to load-balance congested links. Because of
all the aforementioned difficulties, predicting paths is still a topic of ongoing
research.
Gao proposed to predict the types of paths by first classifying the business
relationships of links in order to determine likely traffic flow patterns [26].
Gao first observed that AS-level paths on the Internet follow a valley-free
property. Paths can be divided into three categories. Customer-to-provider
paths that the customer must pay to use are classified as uphill paths. Peer-
to-peer and sibling paths that are free for each end are considered flat paths.
Provider-to-customer paths that make money for the providers are considered
downhill paths. Since the ASes inherently are in business to choose cheap
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paths, they do not advertise routes through links that they do not get paid to
route traffic. Therefore, they do not create “Valleys” in the AS path where
traffic is routed between two links which both cost the AS money. The clas-
sification of AS-level links is important in order to create paths which follow
the high-level routing restrictions imposed by AS administrators. Building
on Gao’s link classification algorithm, Mao et al. proposed a path predic-
tion algorithm to predict paths on the Internet based primarily on a shortest
path algorithm constrained by the valley-free property [27]. Qiu and Gao ex-
tended this initial algorithm to add advertised routes from route information
broadcasts (RIBs) in order to further increase the accuracy of the algorithm
[28]. This algorithm was used in previous work on AS-level path inference as
conducted by Edman and Syverson [23]. The basic steps are given below:
1. Classify links from RIBs to determine the type of each link in the graph.
2. Find the closest matching RIB advertised route.
3. Append links as necessary observing the valley-free property in order
to predict the most likely route traffic will traverse.
Link classification is accomplished simply by observing the graph connec-
tivity of the AS and classifying nodes with higher connectivity as the provider
in the peering relationship. If the ASes have similar degrees of connectivity
in the graph and multiple appearances of peering relationships, they will be
assigned a sibling or peer-to-peer relationship. Once classified, the actual ad-
vertised paths in the route information broadcasts are enumerated in order
to find advertised paths. The actual path to predict is then compared to the
known paths and the best path is chosen with preference to exact matches. If
no exact matches are found, then ASes are appended to the known routes in
observance with the valley free principle to create the best candidate path.
Qiu and Gao observed a 90% success rate in predicting AS-level paths in
their paper published in 2004. We therefore use this algorithm as the base-
line for predicting paths in the current investigation into AS-level adversaries
to anonymous communication.
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3.3 Experimental Setup
To determine the threat of AS and IX-level adversaries to anonymous com-
munication, the probability of Tor selecting a compromised path must be
determined. Tor’s default selection scheme is well known and the available
onion routers are public knowledge. Using this information, a Tor path se-
lection simulator was written in C++, which selects paths according to the
rules presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The simulator takes as input a Tor
consensus document and will select paths with the same distribution as a real
Tor client. Once paths are chosen, they need to be checked for vulnerabilities
to AS and IX compromise. Since this requires the AS-level path, an AS-level
path prediction simulator was also written in C++, which takes as input
route information broadcasts (RIBs) from the Route Views project [29] and
solves the top AS-level path problem as well as the top likely AS-level path
problem. The AS-level path prediction simulator outputs a list of the top
potential AS-level paths along which traffic may be routed. The output of
the Tor path selection simulator can then be used to feed the client and host
paths into the AS path level simulator to generate a list of candidate ASes for
the client path and the host path. Threats from AS-level adversaries are then
identified if the same AS appears in the path predictions for both the client
and host paths. IX-level adversaries are more difficult to identify since multi-
ple ASes can peer at a single IX point. Unfortunately, Internet exchanges are
not forthcoming with their peering agreements. Augustine et al. conducted
a detailed study of AS-level peering agreements at Internet exchange points
and compiled a list of known AS-to-AS peerings at each identified exchange
point [30]. In order to determine which ASes are peering at which IX points,
we use this list of known IXP peerings. The identification of IX vulnera-
bilities is conducted by first generating a path using the Tor path selection
simulator. The list of candidate AS paths for the client path and host path
are then generated from the AS-level path prediction simulator. Next, each
AS-to-AS hop in the paths is mapped to potential IX points using the list of
known IX peerings. A path is then considered compromised to an IX-level
adversary if it contains a candidate IXP in both the client path and the host
path lists simultaneously on the same Tor circuit. Thus, these simulators
allow paths to be chosen from the Tor consensus document with the same
probabilities as Tor and for those paths to then be checked for potential AS
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and IX-level adversaries.
In the above simulations, the client and host path are from a source AS to
the chosen guard node and from the chosen exit node to a destination AS. The
Internet graph used in the simulations contains roughly 40,000 autonomous
systems. In order to keep the simulations tractable, client and host ASes
must be sampled for the experiments. While maximum anonymity is attained
from a uniform distribution of users using the Tor network, the reality is that
certain ASes are more prevalent as both source ASes generating client traffic
as well as destination ASes hosting traffic. Thus, to understand the threat to
the anonymity of Tor (and keep the experiments tractable) the experiments
will be conducted using the top client and host ASes found to be using Tor.
In order to determine the distribution of ASes using Tor, a guard node was
deployed to collect usage data over one week in the fall of 2011. It is impor-
tant to take special care when observing users of an anonymity system such
as Tor. Originating ASes were logged, but specific IP addresses were pur-
posefully discarded. First, all incoming packets bound for the guard’s onion
routing port were captured. The packets were immediately piped through
IPAudit to record the IP addresses of the users [31]. To only record guard
node traffic, the IP addresses of known Tor onions routers were filtered out
and thus not recorded. The remaining IP addresses were then piped through
a script to map them to AS numbers using the GEOIP GeoLite Autonomous
System Number Database [32]. During this process, the IP addresses were
not logged to the hard drive, nor were they stored in any form. The final
output of the data collection was a list of ASes and the aggregate number of
packets and bytes transferred from each AS at ten minute binning intervals.
There has been discussion of the safety of measuring the active Tor network
[12]. We consider our method above as being safe to the users since we
discard the user’s IP addresses immediately and the logged AS numbers are
not sufficient to uniquely identify the user. Furthermore, there is no link
between client ASes and the final destination. While collecting the number
of unique clients per source AS would allow us to measure the anonymity of
the client given knowledge of the source AS, we considered this measurement
too invasive to the privacy of the client. The final output from the algorithm
does not log the actual timing information of the communication but only the
aggregate number of bytes and packets transferred over ten minute intervals.
Thus, the information itself is not useful to de-anonymize the users of the
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Figure 3.2: CDF of Bandwidth by Unique Client ASes
system. We make the final note that the sensitive data including the packets,
the source IP addresses, and the timing information is never recorded to the
hard drive. Thus, it is not recoverable.
The results from the experiment are summarized in Figure 3.2 and Ta-
ble 3.1. Over the course of the week, the guard node observed 407 unique
autonomous systems connecting to the Tor network. Of those connections,
roughly 125 autonomous systems actually sent traffic beyond preemptively
building Tor circuits. Interestingly, 30 autonomous systems were responsible
for 90% of the traffic observed by number of packets sent and total bytes
transferred. Therefore, it seems that at this guard node, the diversity of
client ASes is substantially lower than initially anticipated. The table sum-
marizes the top 35 AS clients observed in the experiment. These results are
similar to the experiments previously conducted by Edman and Syverson
[23].
Having validated that the guard traffic originates from a limited set of
ASes, we next build a list of top destination ASes based on a combination
of previous analysis from Edman and Syverson combined with the results of
the top 30 destinations as determined by the Alexa top sites database [33].
The results from Edman and Syverson’s analysis of destinations contained 20
of the top 30 popular destinations as determined by Alexa. Since we do not
have access to an active Tor exit node, we forgo taking measurements from
an active exit node and instead leverage the prior work combined with up-
dated data from Alexa to generate a list of 35 potential top exit autonomous
systems. The top destination ASes are given in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.1: Client ASes
Rank AS CC Description
1 6128 US Cable Vision Systems
2 25019 SA SaudiNet
3 8972 EU PlusServer Germany
4 6893 CH Sitis Network
5 15467 HU Enternet Libercom
6 32613 CA IWeb Technologies
7 30058 US FDC Servers
8 174 US Cogent
9 47069 US Lyon Labs
10 26347 US Dreamhost
11 12880 IR Information Technology Company
12 5384 AE Emirates Telecom
13 4766 KR Korea Telecom
14 558 US Net 2 EZ
15 20773 DE Host Europe Germany
16 2497 JP Internet Initiative Japan
17 34400 SA Ettihad Etisalat
18 7992 CA Cogeco Cable
19 41495 GB Faelix Limited
20 23393 AU Omni Networks
21 44244 IR Iran Cell Service and Communication Company
22 13768 US Peer 1 Network
23 5607 GB British Sky Broadcasting
24 8404 CH Cablecom
25 33668 US Comcast Cable
26 2518 JP Biglobe
27 3356 US Level 3 Communications
28 20542 FI Sanoma Television
29 29873 US The Endurance International Group
30 12015 US Sunflower Broadband
31 10929 CA Netelligent Hosting Services
32 3595 US Global Net Access
33 8447 AT Telekom Austria
34 2840 SE Stiftelsen Goteborgs Studentbostader
35 26827 US EPB Telecom
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Table 3.2: Destination ASes
Rank AS CC Description
1 4134 CN ChinaNet
2 5169 US DoD Network Information Center
3 43350 NL NForce Entertainment
4 3462 TW HINET
5 1668 US AOL-ATDN
6 21844 US ThePlanet Internet Services
7 4837 CN CNC Group
8 4808 CN China IP Network
9 3356 US Level 3 Communications
10 16265 NL LeaseWeb
11 23393 US ISPrime
12 4812 CN China Telecom
13 4713 JP OCN NTT
14 36351 US SoftLayer
15 26134 US Broad Run Border
16 32934 US Facebook
17 43515 IE Youtube
18 36040 US Youtube
19 36647 US Yahoo
20 7280 US Yahoo
21 36646 US Yahoo
22 2554 JP Yahoo Japan
23 23724 CN China Net
24 14907 US Wikimedia
25 8075 US Microsoft MSN Services
26 13414 US Twitter
27 3598 US Microsoft Corporate
28 20049 US Linked In
29 16509 US Amazon
30 22576 US Layered Technologies
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3.4 Vulnerability to AS and IX Adversaries
Having determined a list of candidate client and destination ASes, the threat
to AS and IX-level adversaries is now determined through experiments using
the developed simulators. Each experiment first selects a client AS and
destination AS from the client and destination lists. Once the destination
and clients are selected, the Tor path selection simulator is used to generate
a potential Tor path using Tor’s circuit building rules. The AS-level path
prediction simulator is then used to generate the client path and host path
lists of candidate ASes, and the IXP peering list is used to map each AS-level
hop to Internet exchange points. The final output is then the list of candidate
ASes and IX points for the client and host paths. The lists are then checked
for simultaneous entries indicating a potential adversary to that particular
Tor circuit. This is done with ASes and IX points in the forward path of
communication, the reverse path of communication and the combination of
forward and reverse communication paths by checking for a compromise on
either the forward path or the reverse path. Each experiment repeats this
process by generating 10,000 Tor paths and checking for vulnerabilities in
order to sample the overall probability of compromise for a given client/host
pair. The output of the experiment is the total number of paths which contain
repeat ASes and repeat IX points on the forward client and host paths, the
reverse client and host paths, and the forward/reverse combination of the
client and host paths, or the total number of paths in each direction which
would be susceptible to compromise for both an AS-level adversary and an
IX-level adversary respectively. This experiment is repeated for every pair
of client/hosts in the lists totaling 35 ∗ 30 = 1050 experiments. Finally each
of these sets of experiments is also repeated using different numbers of the
top most likely paths ranging from one (only the top most likely path from
the AS-level path prediction simulator) to the top five most likely AS-level
paths.
Figure 3.3 shows the results from the experiments predicting the compro-
mise rates for AS-level adversaries. The compromise rate for forward/reverse
paths is roughly 10% for the top path increasing to about 40% for the top
five paths. As expected, the compromise for forward only and reverse only
is lower but almost exactly the same. Only considering the top path from
the path selection simulator produces a similar result as Edman and Syver-
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of Paths Vulnerable to an AS-level Adversary
son’s study; however, when considering the extra top paths the threat of
AS-level adversaries is more severe than initially surmised. We investigate
the necessity of using additional paths in the next section.
Figure 3.4: Percentage of Paths Vulnerable to an IXP-Level Adversary
Figure 3.4 presents the threat of an IX-level adversary. Using the top
predicted path produces a negligible 2% chance of compromise with a linearly
increasing chance up to 10% using the top five predicted paths. While this
percentage is lower than the AS compromise rate, what is really important is
the chance of an individual AS or IX point compromising a Tor circuit. Table
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Table 3.3: Top AS and IX Vulnerabilities
Type AS Number Description Percentage Affected
AS 3356 Level 3 Communications,
Inc.
6.2%
AS 6939 Hurricane Electric, Inc. 1.8%
AS 3549 Level 3 Communications,
Inc.
1.6%
IX Deutscher Commercial In-
ternet Exchange
1.3%
IX Equinix Ashburn Equinix
Ashburn Exchange
.8 %
IX Amsterdam Internet Ex-
change
.7%
AS 3257 Tinet .7%
AS 1299 TeliaNet Global Network .6%
IX London Internet Exchange .5%
AS 7922 Comcast Cable Communi-
cations, Inc.
.5%
3.3 shows the percentage of affected Tor circuits from the simulations for the
ten adversaries most likely to observe Tor circuits considering only the top
predicted path. The simulation finds that Level 3 Communications, a tier-
one AS, routes both the entry path and exit paths in 6.2% of our simulated
circuits. Not surprisingly, the tier one ASes dominate the top adversaries with
two of Level 3 Communication’s ASes included on the list. Interestingly, the
IXPs found in the simulations are mostly located in Europe. The lack of
IXPs located within the United States may be due to the confidential nature
of their peering agreements not allowing them to be accurately represented
in the mapping of AS-to-AS links to IX points. Thus, further work must be
done to ascertain their threat to anonymous communication networks such as
Tor. This result is disturbing since it indicates that a single tier one AS could
compromise a non-trivial portion of Tor circuits. Therefore, it is important
to mitigate the threat of such an adversary violating the privacy guarantees
of the Tor system.
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CHAPTER 4
INFERRING AS-LEVEL PATHS
4.1 Overview
The previous chapter demonstrated how vulnerable anonymous communi-
cation systems such as Tor are to compromise from both AS and IX-level
adversaries. The solution to these vulnerabilities will require clients to be
able to predict the AS-level path that their communication will take from
their source AS to the guard router and the AS-level path that their com-
munication will take from the exit router to the destination AS. The AS
graph used in the previous experiments contains roughly 40,000 ASes from
the RIBs. Therefore, a complete list of source AS to destination AS paths
would require 40, 000 ∗ 40, 000 = 1.6 billion path entries or too many to eas-
ily be downloaded regularly for the average client. An alternate strategy
would be for the client to request known hops from a central server, but
such a strategy also introduces the possibility of an adversary determining
possible onion router selection that a Tor client may have chosen. The most
convenient option would be for a client to be able to predict AS-level paths
locally, thereby mitigating the threats from AS and IX adversaries without
introducing new threats to anonymity or introducing a substantial burden
on resources to the client.
In this chapter, the AS-level path prediction simulator is revisited in order
to create a solution which can be deployed on average client hardware. Once
the new solution is designed, it becomes necessary to revisit the accuracy of
the AS-level path predictions as well as investigate the overall compromise
rates for AS and IX-level adversaries with the new path prediction simu-
lator. Once a scalable, accurate AS-level path simulator is designed, then
countermeasures can be created to eliminate the threat from AS and IX-
level adversaries.
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4.2 Problems with Classical Methods
The AS-level path prediction simulator used in the experimentation in the
previous chapter is a direct implementation of the work of Qiu and Gao The
simulator first reads 1.6 gigabytes of input route information broadcasts. It
then generates a topology of the Internet and classifies each link using Gao’s
method of determining peering relationships. The simulator is then ready
to predict AS-level paths by taking the source and destination ASes and
searching every RIB from the 1.6 gigabytes of input for exact path matches.
This algorithm requires roughly 4 gigabytes to store the information in RAM
while predicting paths and requires computational complexity on the order
of minutes using a Pentium Duo Core processor even on hardware which
can support the computation entirely in memory. Unfortunately, this is
beyond the hardware requirements which can be expected from a typical
client machine. Therefore, the algorithm will need to be redesigned to run
with more modest hardware requirements.
4.3 The Changing Internet
The current trend on the Internet is for more ASes to adopt peering agree-
ments directly between each other and at Internet exchange points. The
growing presence of peering at Internet exchange points is not as studied in
previously studied models of the AS-level topology and, therefore, has caused
apprehension as to the current level of accuracy of the known AS-level graph
[34]. The previous algorithms have predicted the paths based solely on BGP
announced RIBs. These are often collected through services such as Route-
views, which collect daily BGP announcements at top level tier-one ASes in
order to allow researchers to create topological AS graphs [29]. The problem
is that the valley free property adhered to by the ASes generally prohibits
the AS lower in the graph from advertising peer-to-peer routes up the graph.
This is to prevent them from having to pay their providers to transit traffic
that they do not get paid to transit. The problem is demonstrated in Fig-
ure 4.1. Here we see that the top level AS1 never receives an update from
AS2 about the peering agreement to AS3. Thus, the top level AS1 will as-
sume a route from AS2 to AS3 will traverse: AS2− >AS1− >AS3 instead
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Figure 4.1: Missing Peer-to-Peer Link Problem
of traversing the direct peer-to-peer link. In this situation, a RIB broadcast
from AS1 will miss the peering link and thus RIBs taken from that node
will not be able to predict traffic through those nodes correctly. This simple
problem requires that different methodologies must be utilized in order to
both discover the Internet exchange point in the graph and determine the
routes utilizing these peer-to-peer routes.
In order to predict peer-to-peer relationships on the AS graph, it is neces-
sary to find and add the peering links to the graph as well as use a path pre-
diction algorithm which is not dependent on the missing peer-to-peer paths
at the top-level ASes. Augustin et al. conducted the most detailed study
to date of the Internet exchange points and their customers [30]. Augustine
mapped IXPs by manually collecting information from IXPDatabase and
Packet Clearing House DB, two sources which maintain voluntary informa-
tion about Internet exchange points [35], [36]. They observed that the IXP’s
motivation to make money often causes them to advertise the parties peering
with them; however, the peering matrices themselves are often kept private.
By combining the publicly available peer lists and results from reverse DNS
lookups on the prefixes owned by known exchange points, they assembled the
most up-to-date list of IXPs and their customers. They then used looking
glass servers scattered around the Internet to mount traceroute level prob-
ing in order to ascertain the peering matrices in use at the known exchange
points. While it is almost certain that many peering links are still unknown,
this work is the most complete mapping of internet exchange peering data
assembled to date.
Unfortunately, the previous path inference algorithms will not account for
these new peer-to-peer links because they will not be contained in the RIBs
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as seen by top level ASes. Thus, we must turn back to historically less
accurate path prediction algorithms. Recently, Yang and Dou proposed an
efficient path prediction algorithm to find the shortest path by starting at
the destination and target and crawling up the graph one hop at a time [37].
The algorithm basically repeats until intersections are found then crawls the
graph looking for shortest paths. While this is close to what is required
for our purposes, it has the potential to miss longer paths which would be
considered cheaper for an autonomous system. Thus, we build upon the
method with a novel algorithm presented in the next section.
4.4 A New Path Prediction Algorithm
We desire an algorithm to predict least cost paths on the Internet. We
assume the standard simplified model of an AS-level graph with directed
links classified as customer-to-provider, provider-to-customer, peer-to-peer,
or sibling-to-sibling. We furthermore assume that ASes prefer the cheapest
path at each hop. Thus, we assume that they adhere to the valley free
property. We modify the idea of Yang’s algorithm in order to handle the
special case as shown in Figure 4.2. Note in this example that two paths
exist from AS1 to AS5. The first path is AS1→AS2→AS3→AS4→AS5. The
second path is AS1→AS2→AS4→AS5. Note that the second path is shorter,
but in reality, the first path will be preferred because given the choice, AS2
would rather send traffic down its money making link to AS3 than over the
peer link to AS4. This demonstrates the hazard of simply preferring shortest
paths and motivates the need to prefer economically incentivized paths.
We therefore propose the following algorithm. Given a graph G(N,E) with
N AS nodes and E links or edges, we first start at the destination and crawl
all Provider-to-Customer edges to create a complete up graph of links for
the source. This creates a subset Dup which contains all nodes which have a
completely paid downhill path to the destination. The second stage of the
algorithm crawls up the customer-to-provider links starting at the source AS
looking over customer-to-provider links, peer-to-peer links, and sibling links
one hop at a time looking for nodes contained in Dup. If a node is found,
then the path is added to the list of potential paths. We assume that at
each tier the node would prefer strict downhill paths over intersections found
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Figure 4.2: Problem with Using Shortest Path Prediction
across peer-to-peer and sibling links. The algorithm then orders paths based
on the shortest uphill path from the source to the inflection point in the
path combined with the frequency of seeing the links in case of a tie. Thus,
it orders on the cheapest path from the client’s point of view. The various
aspects of the algorithm are outlined below:
Algorithm 1 predicts paths by first building the up graph which contains
all the paid paths or provider-to-customer links down to the destination.
The algorithm then iterates over the uphill links from the source by calling
the crawl Up function which crawls up the graph looking for whole paths.
The loop repeats each time crawling further up the graph until the algorithm
either returns the maximum number of paths or traverses beyond what would
be a reasonable path length.
Algorithm 2 runs recursively until the graph Dup is built which contains
all strictly downhill paths to the destination router. It accomplishes this by
recursively crawling up the graph, each time adding nodes with a provider-to-
customer link to the current node which were not previously in the up graph
to Dup and continuing to crawl up the graph. The algorithm iterates until
it has exhausted all the provider-to-customer links thus creating a complete
graph of downhill paths to the destination.
Algorithm 3 crawls up the graph from the source looking for intersections
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Algorithm 1 Infer Routes Function
Input: src, dest
Output: paths
PathList paths = ∅
Graph Dup[N,E] = ∅
Dup = build Upgraph(dest)
depth = 1
found = 0
while found <maxfound and depth <maxdepth do
path P = emptyPath
found += crawl Up(src, depth, P)
depth++
end while
return paths
Algorithm 2 Build Up Graph Function
Input: destination node N
Output: full upgraph Dup
for ∀ edges E | E.dest == N do
if E.type == provider to customer link then
if E.src 3 Dup then
Dup ← E.src
build Upgraph(E.src)
end if
end if
end for
return Dup
with the downhill nodes. The function returns if the current node is already
in the path in order to eliminate routing loops. It then sets its depth and
appends the current node to the route. If the depth is zero, then it checks
to see if there are any customer-to-provider, sibling-to-sibling or peer-to-peer
links connecting to a node contained in Dup. If there is such a link, then
it has found a possible path so it calls down graph to add the remaining
downhill hops onto the path. If there are no such links, then there are no
paths through this branch so it returns. The algorithm crawls up the graph
recursively by calling itself again each time passing the corresponding edge’s
destination node as the new base node and decrementing the depth variable.
The recursion is terminated by not calling when the depth variable reaches
zero.
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Algorithm 3 Crawl Up Function
Input: Source node S, Current depth, Path P
Output: number of paths found, (also adds to paths)
if S ∈ P then
return 0
end if
found = 0
depth -= 1
P.append(S)
P.length++
for ∀ edges E ∈ S do
if depth == 0 and S.type != Provider to Customer then
if E.dest ∈ graph Dup then
P.append(E.dest)
found += crawl Down(E.dest, P)
end if
else if depth >0 and E.type == Customer to Provider then
found += Crawl up(E.dest, depth, P)
end if
end for
P.length = P.length - 1
return found
Algorithm 4 crawls back down the graph from the intersection node to the
destination, adding the relevant paths at each hop. When it finds the target
node, then it adds the completed path to the path list and returns.
4.5 Path Prediction Simulator
We implemented our algorithm by developing an AS-level path prediction
simulator written in C++. The simulator accepts as input MRT2 format-
ted RIBs as downloaded from the Route Views Project. The simulator can
also take input AS-level topology from the CAIDA project [38], the DIMES
project [39] and UCLA’s Internet topology collection [40]. Finally, the sim-
ulator takes as input the IXP links as generated by the Internet exchange
mapping project [30]. The simulator generates a directed graph based on the
above input sources. It then runs Gao’s link classification algorithm in order
to classify links. At this stage, the simulator outputs a full graph of the AS-
level topology in binary form. The simulator then predicts paths utilizing
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Algorithm 4 Crawl Down Function
Input: Intersection Node N, Path P
Output: number of paths found, (also adds to paths)
found = 0
for ∀ edges E ∈ N do
if E.dest == target then
P.append(E.dest)
paths← P
found++
else
if E.dest 3 P then
P.append(E.dest)
found += crawl Down(E.dest, P)
end if
end if
end for
return found
the new path prediction algorithm by reading the graph file and generating
a list of the top candidate paths. The new path prediction code can be used
by clients to choose safe AS and IX-level paths. The graph generating algo-
rithm requires a large input dataset and roughly five minutes of computation
on a server with six-core AMD Opteron processors and 132 GB of RAM;
however, the final graph compresses with gzip to a mere 800 kilobytes worth
of information. Therefore, it is easy to implement a server which generates
such a graph at daily intervals and then have clients download the file. The
actual path inference algorithm is simple and can easily be run on a user’s
machine. Running on a 2.6 GHz Duo Core machine, a path’s validity can be
checked on the order of a few seconds utilizing only 4 MB of RAM. Thus,
the Tor clients could easily be modified to use the algorithms in this paper
to select paths not prone to compromise.
4.6 Accuracy of the Lowest-Cost Path Prediction
Algorithm
The accuracy of the new path prediction algorithm is now investigated before
revisiting the compromise rates for AS and IX-level adversaries. The algo-
rithm is compared against the original RIB update path prediction algorithm
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Figure 4.3: Accuracy of Path Prediction Compared to Qiu’s Classic
Algorithm
(Qiu). The new algorithm is tested with the RIB information from Route
Views (RIB LC), with the AS-level topology from CAIDA (CAIDA), with
the AS-level topology from DIMES (DIMES), with the Internet exchange
point links from the IX Mapping Project plus the RIB information (IX),
with the AS-level measurements from the University of California Los Ange-
les (UCLA) and finally with all sources of data combined to form one graph
(ALL).
We first assess our algorithm by looking at the probability of the new
algorithm finding the same predicted paths as Qiu’s original algorithm by
comparing the results of the predicted Tor paths from client ASes to guard
nodes and from exit nodes to destination ASes as determined in the last
chapter. Thus, the experiment looked at 35 clients and 791 guards and 30
destinations and 1069 exit nodes. This yields 35 ∗ 791 + 30 ∗ 1069 = 59, 755
total paths. The experiment is conducted looking not only to see if the top
path matches, but also investigating if any of the top paths match as well.
Figure 4.3 shows the results from the experiment. The top path itself often
differs significantly from the top path predicted with the classic algorithm;
however, the top predicted path by the classic algorithm is also predicted by
our least cost algorithm with 70% likelihood considering the top three paths
and 80% considering the top five paths. Not surprisingly, the various other
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data sets diverged from the Route Views experiments since they used different
input data to generate the underlying graph. Interestingly, the UCLA data
gave almost identical paths, perhaps indicating that UCLA’s data is just a
re-hash dump from the Route Views data. The IXP and DIMES experiments
gave a different set of paths indicating that those sets contained information
not contained in the Route Views data. Not surprisingly, a combination of
all the input files yielded the most divergence from the straight Route Views
prediction. The performance gain of our algorithm and reduction in state
information required still give the same top path 80% of the time if the new
algorithm considers the top five paths. We also observe that the other input
data sets contain path information not seen in the Route Views RIB dumps,
thus adding more information to the graph.
Qiu and Gao concluded that path prediction algorithms without RIB infor-
mation provided lower accuracy than their algorithm with RIB information.
While most recent studies have only assessed their algorithms against Qiu and
Gao’s algorithm, we will also assess our path prediction algorithm against
real traceroute logs. To facilitate the ability to tractably take traceroute
measurements, we used measurements taken off of the planet lab distributed
computing platform by the University of Washington’s iPlane project [41].
These traceroute measurements are conducted on a daily basis from each
available Planet Lab node to every reachable AS on the Internet. The tracer-
oute data is first prepared by mapping the IP addresses in the path to AS
numbers. The traceroute paths are filtered for repeat ASes by counting each
repeated AS once in the path. For experimental purposes, 1000 ASes are
randomly selected for use as destinations in the data set. The initial data set
contains 112 source ASes and 1000 destination ASes. This gives traceroute
path prediction data for 112,000 AS-to-AS paths. To evaluate the path pre-
diction algorithm, the list of 112,000 paths is predicted by the AS-level path
simulator with each of the input data sets used in the first experiment.
Figure 4.4 shows the match percentage of the prediction simulator com-
pared to the traceroute paths. The results are substantially lower than Qiu
and Gao’s previously reported 90% accuracy. The experimental results in-
stead demonstrate about a 30% match rate for the top path. In all cases, the
new algorithm using the various input files outperforms the classic top match
when considering multiple paths. While higher accuracy is attained by look-
ing at the RIB data for an exact path match, the new cheaper algorithm still
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Figure 4.4: Accuracy of Path Prediction Compare to Traceroute Data
maintains a 40% accuracy with the top 5 paths considered compared to the
50 % maintained with the classical algorithm.
While the probability of getting an exact match to the traceroute path is
less likely than previously predicted, it is still important to understand the
probability of predicting both the ASes the traffic will traverse and what
AS-to-AS hops it will take. We therefore conducted an experiment to try to
ascertain how accurate our path prediction algorithm was even if it made a
few mistakes by relaxing the exact match criteria. A mistake is considered
one of the following: an extra AS hop in the middle of a path, a missing
AS hop in the middle of a path, or one AS different from what it should
be in a path. We also eliminate certain flawed paths from our traceroute
data. For example, it seems common to see traffic traverse from AS A-to-B-
to-A-to-B then continue toward the destination. The data set is parsed to
replace this pattern with a simple A-to-B transition. The results from this
experiment are shown in Figure 4.5. Already, eliminating erroneous loops
in the traceroute data boosts the accuracy of the classical RIB predictions
up to 46% and the results of the new prediction algorithm considering the
top ten predicted paths up to about 60%. The LC predictions considering
the top ten paths are accurate with 80% probability if one path prediction
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Figure 4.5: CDF of Errors in Path Prediction
Figure 4.6: Percent ASes and Links Seen in Predicted Paths
error is allowed and about 93% if two errors are allowed. With the average
path length being 6 hops, this demonstrates that the prediction algorithm
finds paths that are similar to the actual path in a majority of the cases;
however, it has difficulty getting some of the links. Often the simulator finds
the correct path, but ranks it lower in tie cases. Thus, it may be possible to
improve the tie breaking metric, but leave other improvements to the path
predicting algorithm as a topic of future work.
The important result of the path prediction is the identification of unique
ASes and AS-to-AS links which may be contained in the paths. Figure 4.6
demonstrates the percentage of ASes and Links found. Thus, in a worst-
case scenario the ASes and links observed may not be in the AS-level path,
but a majority of the ASes and links that were seen in the traceroute data
are correctly identified. Even though the prediction algorithm only gives
40% accuracy with the top paths problem, it still identifies 90% of the ASes
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involved in the traceroute paths and 70% of the links. Therefore, it can
predict if the same ASes exist on the client and host paths even without the
exact top path. This allows the predictions to still identify if the AS and IX
points are on both ends of the circuit. Finally the experiment shows that
the drop in accuracy when using the lowest cost simulator is negligible when
determining if the AS and AS-to-AS links are seen on the predicted paths.
Thus, the reduced cost method is a deployable way for the client to avoid
vulnerabilities to AS and IX-level adversaries.
4.6.1 Updated Compromise Rates
Having developed a new novel path prediction algorithm, we now verify the
compromise rates. Figure 4.7 shows the vulnerability to AS path compromise
and Figure 4.8 shows the vulnerability to IX-level adversaries. As expected,
the vulnerability rates are slightly higher with longer path lengths due to the
new selection algorithm selecting multiple top paths. Thus, the client may
eliminate some paths unnecessarily when building Tor circuits. The possible
negative effects on load balancing and anonymity are investigated in Chapter
6.
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Figure 4.7: Calculated Vulnerability to AS Adversary Using New Path
Prediction
Figure 4.8: Calculated Vulnerability to IX Adversary Using New Path
Prediction
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CHAPTER 5
COUNTERMEASURES
5.1 Overview
Having determined the threat of AS and IXP-level adversaries and devel-
oped a deployable method to predict AS-level paths on the internet, we now
turn our attention to methodologies to mitigate the threats to anonymous
communication systems. It is imperative that such countermeasures be scal-
able and deployable both in terms of computational ability on the client and
bandwidth across the system. Furthermore, it is important that counter-
measures be analyzed for possible information leaks or losses of anonymity
in the system. For example, if a countermeasure mitigates the possibility of
an IXP observing the traffic, but allows an adversary to predict the client’s
choice of nodes for the anonymous circuit, then the countermeasure has in
effect lowered the security guarantee of the system.
5.2 The Countermeasure
We propose that a client download our AS-level graph and use the least
cost AS path prediction simulator in order to choose paths not vulnerable
to compromise from AS and IX adversaries. Therefore, the client will build
circuits using the default path selection, then use the AS-level path simulator
using the least-cost prediction to determine if the path could be compromised
from AS and IX-level adversaries. If a potential threat is identified, the client
will discard the path and randomly select another. Thus, the client will
completely avoid all AS and IX-level threats identified by the methodology
presented in this thesis.
Since Tor needs to be as fast as possible while still maintaining anonymity,
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implementing the proposed changes in path selection requires analysis both
into the load balancing of the network as well as into the effect of anonymity
of the user. Differing capabilities among volunteers has necessitated that Tor
choose routers based on available bandwidth to load-balance the network.
Furthermore, entry nodes are initially chosen and then reused for extended
circuit construction in order to limit the visibility of a specific client on the
network. Thus, already there is some loss in entropy in the Tor network
as well as some load balancing to try to assign more load to more capable
servers.
It is important to analyze the effects on Tor of implementing this new se-
lection scheme both to the load balancing and privacy of the system. The
privacy of the system could be threatened if the new path selection algorithm
causes certain client ASes to have a unique distribution of nodes to choose
from when building circuits for anonymous communication. Currently, the
load balancing in Tor does not threaten privacy since every client chooses
nodes from the same probability distribution. Unfortunately, choosing paths
to mitigate the threat to AS and IX-level adversaries necessitates that clients
eliminate certain entry/guard pairs uniquely to the source AS. Thus, this se-
lection scheme could leak entropy and reduce overall privacy, necessitating
an investigation into the possibility of entropy loss. It is unclear how the
load balancing will be affected since this is determined by how many nodes
are unusable due to the threats from AS and IX-level adversaries, but perfor-
mance from the load balancing scheme should also be investigated. We now
investigate both privacy and load balancing in light of our proposed change.
5.3 Load Balancing
Without regard for AS and IX-level adversaries, the default Tor path selection
will cause each client node to weight the routers equally when selecting their
paths. Thus, load can be balanced across the routers by weighting the choice
of routers proportionally to the measured available bandwidth. We now
investigate the load balancing on the Tor network if the client nodes eliminate
all paths susceptible to compromise. The path prediction simulator is utilized
to generate 10,000 paths for each of the client ASes as determined in Chapter
3 and the selected paths are noted. The experiment is conducted with Tor’s
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Figure 5.1: Simulated Bandwidth Allocation
default route selection and repeated for the proposed selection eliminating
the paths susceptible to compromise. To estimate the bandwidth requested
for each path, a request bandwidth is sampled from the distribution of path
bandwidths as measured from the guard router experiment in Chapter 3 of
this thesis. The total requested bandwidth is then normalized in proportion
to the total bandwidth of the network in order to compare the portion of
network capacity each router is being asked to service. Figure 5.1 shows
the results of the experiment. The results are plotted from the default Tor
selection, the new selection AS and IX safe selection, as well as an ideal
plot if each router had been loaded with exact proportion to its bandwidth
in the consensus document. The experiment demonstrates that the default
path selection does deviate from the ideal; however, it seems to load-balance
fairly accurately with certain nodes gaining slightly more than their share
of bandwidth and some slightly less. Nodes which have both guard and
exit flags in the consensus document have a tendency to gain slightly more
bandwidth and nodes which have neither guard nor exit attain slightly less
overall bandwidth. The experiment clearly demonstrates that the AS and IX
safe path selection algorithm introduces more variation from the ideal curve
with some nodes getting substantially less load and some nodes attaining
substantially more.
Figure 5.2 shows the load balancing results with a zoomed axis. It is
obvious that some nodes are chosen much more than their share of bandwidth
due to their locations on the AS graph containing paths without common
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Figure 5.2: Simulated Bandwidth Allocation without Outliers
Figure 5.3: Simulated Bandwidth Allocation Showing Nodes with Zero
Bandwidth
top-level ASes. Thus, they do not get eliminated from the path selection
often. Extreme bandwidth inflation occurs when a client chooses a guard
node which can only use a severely reduced set of exit nodes. Since the
client only selects three guard nodes, a guard which can only choose one or
two exits causes the bandwidth on those exit nodes to be greatly inflated.
Conversely, some nodes are simulated to get reduced load. These nodes are
located in sections of the AS graph with a tendency to have multiple top-
level ASes in their potential paths, causing them to be eliminated from the
path selection process with greater frequency. Figure 5.3 shows the extreme
cases where certain nodes were always eliminated from the path selection.
While some higher bandwidth nodes saw greatly reduced service, no nodes
which advertised over 200 KB were completely eliminated from selection.
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Perhaps with a greater variety of client ASes, these nodes would see more
service. Finally, the experiment demonstrates some distinct bands of service
levels. These correspond to clusters of nodes which see common top-level
ASes in their paths. Thus, they are eliminated with similar probabilities
and see similar rates of selection in the path selection process. Bandwidth
distribution is affected by how paths are eliminated due to which top-level
ASes tend to be in the path from the exits to the target ASes. Unfortunately,
it seems that ASes located in areas of the Internet graph which do not contain
top-level ASes and IX links would be able to compromise a disproportionate
number of links. Thus, it would be in an adversary’s best interest to insert
nodes into the graph at those points and have them attain the exit flag.
A simple solution to this problem would be for the client to confirm that
creating paths to a specific target AS should use a guard node which is able
to select a high number of exit nodes. Thus, a client will not choose a guard
node which can only use a reduced set of exit nodes. If a client already has
three guard nodes, and all three only see a reduced set of exit nodes, then the
client should add another guard. Ideally, the client should be able to choose
all exits with all three of the chosen guard nodes, but setting a threshold will
limit the possibility of a single exit node being reused too often. Thus, this
introduces a trade-off between utilization of available exit nodes versus the
exposure of the client using the Tor network.
5.4 Entropy Loss
The principle problem with having clients select paths without AS and IX
vulnerabilities is that it introduces the possibility of the client choosing paths
uniquely depending on which AS it resides. Thus, we will now investigate
the entropy loss of the client’s AS. We assume that an adversary can observe
the exit path from the Tor network. This allows the adversary to see both
the exit node and the target destination as well as their respective ASes.
Given this information, the adversary is trying to determine the client’s AS.
Formally the adversary knows e ∈ E and t ∈ T . The adversary is interested
in determining c ∈ C and the client must choose a guard node out of the
set of known guard nodes g ∈ G. The adversary is therefore interested in
predicting the probability of a specific client with the known information or
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formally Equation 5.1.
P (C = c|E = e ∩ T = t) (5.1)
P (C|E ∩ T ) = P (C|G ∩ E ∩ T ) ∗ P (G) (5.2)
P (C|E ∩ T ) = P (C|G ∩ E ∩ T ) ∗ P (G)
=
P (E|C ∩G ∩ T ) ∗ P (C|G ∩ T )
P (E|G ∩ T ) ∗ P (G)
(5.3)
Wc =
∑
∀g∈G
P (E = e|C = c ∩G = g ∩ T = t) ∗ P (C = c|G = g ∩ T = t)
P (E = e|G = g ∩ T = t)
∗P (G = g)
(5.4)
P (C = c|E = e ∩ T = t) = Wc∑
∀c∈CWc
(5.5)
Ec = −
∑
∀c∈C
P (C = c|E = e ∩ T = t)log2P (C = c)|E = e ∩ T = t) (5.6)
Of course, this probability depends on the guard node chosen as shown
in Equation 5.2. Using simple Bayesian analysis, the adversary can manip-
ulate this probability into a form more easily determined with the known
information as shown in Equation 5.3. In this equation, the probability of
the exit given the client, target, and guard and the probability of the exit
given the target and guard are easily enumerated by the attacker in lieu of
the path selection constraints. The probability of the guard is well known
and the probability of the client does not depend on the target and guard
but is instead assumed to be uniformly distributed for this analysis. Us-
ing these formulas, a module was written to the previously used simulators
which generates the weight of a client being selected as shown in Equation
5.4. This enumerates over each guard to determine the weight of a certain
client being selected. The weights are then converted into probabilities as
shown in Equation 5.5 and calculated for all clients. Finally, the total en-
tropy is calculated using the standard entropy formula given in Equation 5.6
in order to determine the potential loss in privacy to the client AS.
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Figure 5.4: Entropy Due to New Path Selection
To determine the actual threat to the anonymity of the communication,
the above entropy calculation was utilized assuming an attacker is trying to
determine the actual source AS of the communication. The client chooses
paths in the experiment to eliminate the threat of AS and IX-level adver-
saries. This is simulated by first choosing a client AS and destination AS
from the top client and destination lists from Chapter 3. The client then
chooses nodes for a Tor circuit using the Tor path selection simulator and
eliminates possible paths if they contain vulnerabilities to AS and IX adver-
saries by utilizing the data from the AS-level path simulator. The analysis
from the previous equations is then utilized to determine the entropy drop
for each selected path with respect to identifying the source client AS. For
each client/destination AS pair, 150 Tor paths are generated and the ex-
periment is repeated for every pair yielding 150 ∗ 30 ∗ 35 = 183, 750 total
data points. Figure 5.4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the
entropy drop from the experiment. Ideally, the odds of a certain client being
the source client would contain log2(35) = 5.1 bits of entropy. By using the
aforementioned methods for determining clients, 50% of clients still maintain
5 bits of entropy with the biggest entropy drop being about 4.4 bits. Thus,
we determine that the entropy loss due to the new path selection algorithm
is negligible.
Even with a reduced sample of client ASes, the entropy of the ASes is
negligibly affected by discarding paths prone to compromise. More ASes in
the system should help further stabilize the entropy. Thus, the privacy of the
system is only strengthened with the new path selection. The proposed path
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selection eliminates the threat of AS and IX-level compromise as predicted
in this thesis. Already, anonymous communication systems such as Tor have
been forced to sacrifice ideal load balancing in favor of security to the privacy
of the system. While the load balancing is adversely affected, the privacy
gains are important to protect the privacy of the system from a real and
present threat to the privacy guarantees. Therefore, we conclude that the
path selection algorithm as presented only serves to improve anonymity by
mitigating the threat to AS and IX level adversaries and should be adopted
to maintain privacy guarantees in current systems.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusions
We have analyzed the threat of AS and IX-level adversaries on Tor, cur-
rently the most widely deployed and used anonymity overlay network. We
developed a novel AS-level path prediction algorithm in order to predict com-
promise rates. Our path prediction algorithm sacrifices some accuracy in the
top path prediction in order to decrease the hardware requirements necessary
to predict AS-level paths. The new path selection algorithm is simple enough
to run on a standard client while still predicting the ASes and IXPs contained
in the paths with roughly 40% accuracy compared to the 50% accuracy found
with classical methods. We validated the accuracy first compared to Qiu and
Gao’s classic algorithm, then compared to actual traceroute readings taken
from Planet Lab nodes. These experimental results demonstrate that clas-
sical path prediction is performing far below expectations as presented in
the author’s original work when searching for exact matches. We do predict
paths with similar sets of ASes and links finding 90% of the actual ASes seen
in the trace route data. This implies that we are eliminating the paths with
the same ASes with significantly higher accuracy even without an exact top-
level path match. We leave improving methods of measuring and predicting
paths on the Internet as an open and very necessary topic of future work.
Based on the results of our path simulator, we then simulated Tor’s path
selection algorithm with data from the current Tor consensus documenta-
tion. We find that the threat to Tor from AS-level adversaries is still present
and that Tor is also nontrivially vulnerable to IX-level adversaries especially
if the user assumes the worst case by using multiple top predicted paths in
the path prediction simulator. We then investigated the effects of choosing
paths using our path predictions and find that load balancing is adversely
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affected. We particularly recommend that clients are careful to not over-
select exit nodes when building paths through guard nodes with limited exit
choices. Doing so may allow adversaries at certain exit points to see a dis-
proportional amount of traffic. We finish by noting that the entropy drop in
possible clients is negligible. Thus, the client should not be able to be iden-
tified based solely on the choice of exit and target pairs. We leave further
analysis of possible security risks as the topic of ongoing work; however, our
initial results demonstrate that our path simulator is a lightweight solution
to defend against AS and IX-level compromise of anonymous communication
paths on the Internet.
6.2 Future Work
The accuracy of the path prediction simulator is currently limited by the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the underlying AS-level graph. Thus, to improve
this method more accurate AS-level graphs must be generated. In general
terms, improvements to the collection, verification, and completeness of the
AS-level graph are a major topic of future work. The path prediction algo-
rithm itself would greatly benefit from improvement especially to eliminate
excess paths which may unnecessarily eliminate legitimate paths. The IX
peering database should be regularly updated beyond the initial data collec-
tion conducted in 2008 by Augustine et al. Additionally, new methods need
to be developed to identify and classify peering links in IXPs located in the
United States. Experiments from Chapter 2 indicated that the top IX adver-
saries were located in Europe. This is probably due to the mapping project
getting a larger snapshot of clients since the European IX points advertise
their customers. Internet exchange points located in the United States keep
customer lists secret and are thus harder to find and map. Therefore, the lack
of United States IX points in the top adversary lists may indicate missing
customers in the database, and better methods must be developed to get a
greater understanding of these IX points.
Besides improving the path prediction algorithms and underlying AS-level
graphs, further research should be conducted into the implications for the
Tor system. While the change does not introduce a major entropy drop with
a single circuit, intersection attacks may still be possible to reduce entropy
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over time. As is well known, clients should always attempt to make linking
multiple circuits over time difficult; however, the possibility of an intersection
attack is left as a topic of future work. Finally, the scale of the simulations
should be expanded in order to better model the effects of load balancing on
the network. With a sample of 35 client ASes, the load balancing is negatively
impacted; however, with more users and a greater diversity of client ASes, the
load may balance more uniformly than predicted in the initial simulations.
We leave the exploration of this a topic of future work.
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